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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human development as advanced, among 
others, by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and seek to provide some theoretical resources for better 
understanding our obligations to future persons. It is my hope that the capabilities approach, properly applied, can 
give us a novel way of understanding our responsibilities toward future generations in a time where such an 
understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly needed. Structurally, the paper will proceed as 
follows: First, I’ll give a brief reconstruction of a capability-based approach to justice, examining the view’s 
foundation and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s list of ten core capabilities as a basis, I will draw on recent work 
by Breena Holland to establish the notion of a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the 
enablement and protection of those human capabilities which Nussbaum argues are morally and politically central. 
Central to this discussion is the argument that, to a significant extent, many central capabilities are dependent on 
various functions of the natural environment. Finally, I will make some forward-looking applications of a 
capability-based account to the context of intergenerational justice and highlight some justifications for using the 
approach in this way. Here, I submit that the capabilities approach is well-fitted to the task of theorizing about 
intergenerational justice when compared to some other popular approaches. Ultimately, I argue that such an 
approach offers a unique vehicle for understanding the vulnerability of future people in the wake of anthropogenic 
climate change, as well as our obligations to refrain from harming them, insofar as possible. 
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Introduction 
 In recent history, much social and political theorizing about justice has focused not only 
on articulating and clarifying obligations of justice toward people who are sometimes spatially 
distant from us, but, increasingly, to those who may be temporally distant as well—future 
people. Global climate change presents a striking urgency in this regard, as it stands to 
disproportionally harm not only the most disadvantaged among our contemporaries, but 
threatens future people as well. Many attempts have been made to explain and defend accounts 
of intergenerational obligations to minimize and mitigate the effects of climate change, e.g., 
Rawlsian just savings and related contractarian accounts, consequentialist attempts at assessing 
the welfare of future persons, rights-based approaches, etc. All too often, these sorts of accounts 
fall prey to various application problems when fitted to an intergenerational context, and I find 
them wanting as a result.  
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 In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human 
development as advanced, among others, by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and seek to 
provide some theoretical resources for better understanding our obligations to future persons. 
It is my hope that the capabilities approach, properly applied, can give us a novel way of 
understanding our responsibilities toward future generations in a time where such an 
understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly needed. Structurally, the paper 
will proceed as follows: First, I’ll give a brief reconstruction of a capability-based approach to 
justice, examining the view’s foundation and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s list of ten core 
capabilities as a basis, I will draw on recent work by Breena Holland to establish the notion of 
a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the enablement and protection of 
those human capabilities which Nussbaum argues are morally and politically central.2 Central 
to this discussion is the argument that, to a significant extent, many central capabilities are 
dependent on various functions of the natural environment. Finally, I will make some forward-
looking applications of a capability-based account to the context of intergenerational justice 
and highlight some justifications for using the approach in this way. Here, I submit that the 
capabilities approach is well-fitted to the task of theorizing about intergenerational justice when 
compared to some other popular approaches. Ultimately, I argue that such an approach offers a 
unique vehicle for understanding the vulnerability of future people in the wake of anthropogenic 
climate change, as well as our obligations to refrain from harming them, insofar as possible. 
 
1. Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach 
 While Nussbaum’s constructive approach to social justice represents the result of some 
direct criticism of the social contract tradition (and of John Rawls, more particularly), it does 
share some intuitive motivation with a Rawlsian approach to justice, namely, in terms of the 
idea that each individual “possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override” (Rawls 1999, 3). The outcomes that Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach generates bear “a close family resemblance to [Rawls’s] principles of 
justice” (Nussbaum 2006, 69). She even goes far as to argue that her constructive view can, in 
many ways, be seen as a sort of extension of the social contract tradition, provided some 
important problems with such a tradition are considered and solved. 
 Building upon a capability-based approach to social economic development advanced 
by Amartya Sen (1995, 1999, 2009), Nussbaum’s approach seeks to establish the theoretical 
underpinning for an account of fundamental human entitlements that “should be respected and 
implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare minimum of what respect for human 
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dignity requires” (Nussbaum 2006, 69). She argues that the best way of providing such an 
account is via a discussion of essential human capabilities, that is, what people are actually able 
to do and be. The approach is informed, as she tells us, by the idea of “a life that is worthy of 
the dignity of the human being,” and, to this end, identifies a list of ten central capabilities that 
must be protected as primary matters of justice. The central capabilities she posits are:  
Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination, and Thought; 
Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; and Control over 
One’s (Political and Material) Environment (2006, 76). 
 
 Nussbaum takes these core capabilities to be the foundation and source of political 
principles for a decent society, and as an essential way of viewing humans as the sort of beings 
that possess the sort of inviolable dignity that makes them the subjects of moral and political 
consideration.3 Beginning with a reliance on an intuitive idea of human dignity, Nussbaum 
argues that each of these capabilities should be pursued for one and all as a method of “treating 
each as an end and none as a mere tool of the ends of others” (2006, 70) in what can perhaps 
be read as a subtle variation on the second formulation of Immanuel Kant’s supreme moral 
principle, the Categorical Imperative.4 The basic idea for Nussbaum is that, with respect to each 
of the aforementioned core capabilities, “we can argue, by imagining a life without the 
capability in question, that such a life is not a life worthy of human dignity” (2006, 78). 
Consider, for instance, a human life that is rife with the experience of discrimination on the 
basis of gender, race, or sexual orientation. On Nussbaum’s view, policies or actions that 
exemplify such practices are markedly unjust because they undermine core capabilities for 
various constituents of human functioning. Directly, discriminatory practices violate the 
seventh capability on Nussbaum’s list: affiliation, insofar as they undermine the social bases of 
self-respect and non-humiliation, or, in other words, “being able to be treated as a dignified 
being whose worth is roughly equal to that of others” (Nussbaum 2006, 77). In some cases, 
discriminatory practices can be seen as violations of other central capabilities as well: Control 
over One’s (Material) Environment in terms of property and employment discrimination, 
Bodily Health and Integrity in terms of vulnerability to assault on the aforementioned bases, or, 
in extreme cases, even Life itself, the first of Nussbaum’s capabilities, in terms of not being able 
to live a life of normal length or dignity. Before turning to the extent to which climate change 
is likely to undermine the capabilities of future generations, I’ll first consider the extent to which 
Nussbaum’s capabilities in general, as well as her correlated notion of human dignity, relate to 
(and in many cases depend on) the natural environment. 
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2. Capabilities and the Natural Environment: Modifying Nussbaum’s Approach 
 As well as being integrally connected with each other as Nussbaum suggests, I submit 
that it makes sense to think of the core capabilities as being dependent on environmental factors. 
In much the same way as the capacities on Nussbaum’s list of entitlements would appear to 
require the first capability (Life) as a necessary prerequisite, some level of external 
environmental functioning is similarly necessary for each of their actualization, and, by 
extension, for human flourishing. It is my contention that by making modifications to the 
capabilities approach to this effect, we can glean a better way of understanding and 
operationalizing the harms caused to both our intragenerational contemporaries and their future 
counterparts by climate change. 
 Similarly to the way Nussbaum argues that the social contract tradition ignores several 
unsolved problems of justice in Frontiers of Justice, Breena Holland (2008) suggests that this 
tradition, with Rawls as its most foremost exemplar, effectively ignores the natural environment 
as a problem of fundamental justice. According to Holland, a contract-based view holds that 
environmental resources are not subject to inequity in their distribution: “the natural 
environment, in other words, does not confer fundamental advantages of wealth and power to 
some and not others” (Holland 2008, 319). So, on Rawls’s view, for instance, there seems to be 
no immediately obvious reason to address environmental issues as a matter of first moral 
importance or of primary (what he might call “background”) justice.  
 Holland argues that this sort of view is mistaken, citing the notion that environmental 
burdens and calamities do, in fact, affect people disproportionately in ways that suggest 
problems of justice. She gives some brief examples of this effect:  
In the United States, for example, neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
poor and minority residents face more severe air pollution. Similarly, residents 
of poor and minority communities face disproportionate exposure to risks posed 
by abandoned hazardous waste sites (2008, 319). 
 
She notes that in cases such as these, unfair disadvantages are indeed conferred upon some and 
not others on an alarmingly unbalanced scale. For instance, a woman living in an inner-city 
neighborhood with an extreme pollution problem may develop severe respiratory health 
problems, thereby closing off the normal avenues via which she might pursue important goals. 
Similarly, ingesting contaminated groundwater or tainted crops could increase vulnerability to 
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deadly diseases, which could bring one’s normal lifespan to a precipitous halt, again, closing 
off the prospect of one’s flourishing in a particularly acute way.  
 These are some basic illustrative cases in which capacity for human flourishing is 
undermined in varying degrees by environmental burdens, some more serious than others. 
Holland uses cases like this to argue that matters of environmental protection and resource 
distribution are worthy of moral consideration and ought to be treated as part of the purview of 
basic claims of justice. Holland’s approach treats particular environmental conditions as 
instrumental to human capabilities in much the same way that Nussbaum might treat shelter, 
nourishment, or property (as instrumental to the Life, Health, Integrity, and Control over 
Environment capabilities). Because environmental functioning at some level is required to 
produce any and all of these things, Holland seeks to establish these environmental conditions 
as an independent “meta-capability,” which suffuses and orders the other morally relevant 
capabilities: “As long as ecological systems have the functional capacity to sustain the 
conditions enabling the minimum threshold level of Nussbaum’s capabilities for each person,” 
she argues, “the ecological conditions of justice are met” (2008, 328). 
 Holland’s idea of an environmental meta-capability, on my view, raises a needed 
innovation to Nussbaum’s brand of the capabilities approach, as environmental values only 
figure explicitly into her view via the Other Species capability.5 While Nussbaum maintains 
that relationships with other species are instrumental to one key aspect of human flourishing 
that she designates as centrally important, she fails to capture the multitude of ways in which 
environmental systems and processes are “indispensable to enabling all of the capabilities she 
advances as central to living a life worthy of the dignity of a human being” (Holland 2008, 
323). Thus, some expansion of the capabilities approach beyond what is explicitly developed 
by Nussbaum will be necessary in order to capture the capabilities’ reliance on environmental 
factors, and thus, I’ll argue, in order to consider its treatment of justice in a world facing the 
ongoing threat of climate change. I’ll consider some general ways in which the core capabilities 
rely on various environmental functions, and then I will consider ways in which these 
considerations might inform an inquiry about the requirements of justice for future generations.  
 Holmes Rolston (1988), among others, has argued for the extent to which human 
development can depend on the natural environment and its various functions (physical, 
scientific, aesthetic, etc.). These relations are often referred to in the wider environmental ethics 
literature discussions as “ecosystem services” or “ecological capital” in some policy 
discussions.6 Beyond being merely expressible in economic terms, many of the services a 
functional natural environment provides are, from the perspective of the capabilities approach, 
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vital for human flourishing, and thus, central to meeting the minimal requirements of justice. 
Some examples will help clarify the natural environment’s relevance for the kinds of flourishing 
specifically identified by the approach—whether they be materially basic capabilities (e.g., 
Life) or more cognitively sophisticated ones (e.g., Practical Reason). I will proceed through 
some of Nussbaum’s core capabilities in turn, and offer some sketches of the relevant 
developmental relations:  
With respect to Life, the first capability, the dependence relation is straightforward. 
Human life is enabled in a multitude of ways by natural functioning. Human flourishing 
obviously requires the various ecological conditions needed for living a life of “normal” length, 
such as food, fresh water, ingredients for disease-preventing medications, and the various forms 
of energy needed to sustain life (e.g., those forces which are necessary to regulate body 
temperature and various other processes). With regard to Bodily Health, similar requirements 
can be given. The capacity to be nourished and to remain in good health requires that ecological 
systems function “at a level that can sustain the provision of soil, water, and atmospheric 
temperature that enable agricultural production and the absorption of human produced waste” 
(Holland 2008, 323). 
 Other capabilities share relations of dependence with the natural environment that are 
less obvious, but no less important. Consider Senses, Imagination, and Thought, Nussbaum’s 
fourth capability, which the environment enables in many relevant ways. In many instances 
(Native American cultural practices, some Eastern religious and cultural traditions, etc.), 
ecological processes and their components are deeply influential where religious, cultural, and 
spiritual elements of human experience and expression are concerned, “making it possible for 
[people] to use their senses, imagination, and thought in ways that make their lives meaningful” 
(Holland 2008, 323). Additionally, and independently of religious and spiritual values, 
ecological systems and processes are often essential to people in terms of aesthetic value, also 
allowing people to use their senses and imaginations in novel ways, as the capabilities approach 
requires. Having the capacity for Play similarly requires natural places in which people can find 
the components of natural processes that allow them “to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational 
activities” (Nussbaum 2006, 76). 
All of these sorts of experience and expression are intimately tied to Practical Reason, 
the capacity to form and act from a conception of the good. We can describe this in practical 
terms by citing the importance of freedom of conscience and religious observance, insofar as 
these things are absolutely essential to many citizens’ conceptions of the good. As an example 
of this, consider some recent claims made a group of Inuit citizens requesting formal reparation 
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from the United States for acute damages caused to their culture by the effects of climate 
change. In a 2005 petition, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC) argues that:  
The transition of their physical environment due to the individual and 
cumulative effects of climate change have undercut the Inuit’s ability to enjoy 
the benefits of their traditional way of life and property, and have imperiled Inuit 
health, safety, subsistence, harvest, travel. These changes are projected to 
accelerate, seriously threatening the Inuit’s continued survival as a distinct and 
unique society (ICC 2005, 67).  
 
Clearly, this petition offers that members of its group are experiencing capability deprivation 
as a result of warming trends, but, something more seems to be at stake here. The Inuit society’s 
particular forms of engagement with the world—their specific ways of subsisting and 
persisting as a distinctive social and cultural group—are left vulnerable. So, not only are the 
Inuit’s lives, health, and property threatened, but, crucially, their capabilities for practical 
reason—namely, their ability for self-determination and planning their lives around a 
conception of the good, are additionally under existential threat. Being able to “have attachment 
to things and people outside ourselves” (Nussbaum 2006, 76) (Affiliation) involves an 
ecosystem in which “one recognizes features of [the environment] that create a ‘sense of place’” 
(Holland 2008, 323). The ICC, in citing its fear of a kind of “extinction,” is lamenting a loss of 
this capability, as Inuit cultural identity is constitutively tied to particular kinds of intra-cultural 
affiliation, relations to other species, and various traditions that stem from both. These 
capabilities, at least for the Inuit, are inextricably tied to various environmental functions, which 
they seem to suggest ought be preserved such that their cultural identity might be preserved.7 
Both these functions, and by extension, Inuit society itself, the claim insists, are existentially 
threatened by precisely the kind of ongoing environmental degradation associated with climate 
change.   
 In order to actualize many of what Nussbaum takes to be the core human capabilities, 
one “must have nourishment, shelter, and the other basic materials that ecological systems 
provide” (Holland 2008, 323-24). Furthermore, to ensure proper freedom of conscience and 
Control over One’s Environment, one’s ecological surroundings must retain the functional 
capacities to perpetuate relevant natural features as a backdrop to support human capabilities, 
and changes in said capacities would need to occur on time scales to which humans can adapt 
(a requirement which climate change directly threatens). As a solution to Nussbaum’s purported 
failure to account for the requisite importance of functioning ecosystems, Holland suggests 
adding “Sustainable Ecological Capacity” as a “meta-capability” that, in various ways, enables 
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all the capabilities Nussbaum lists. This involves being able to live life within the context of 
environmental conditions that can provide “resources and services that enable the current 
generation’s range of capabilities; to have these conditions now and in the future” (Holland 
2008, 324). These ecological functions, on Holland’s view, create the material conditions that 
entail the very possibility of human life and flourishing. She goes as far as to argue that it is 
simply “not possible to exercise the human capabilities outside or independent of functioning 
ecological systems” (Holland 2008, 324).8 Because of this integral role, the ecological meta-
capability Holland proposes should be understood as more fundamental than any entitlement 
on Nussbaum’s original list.  
 Similarly to the “special importance” Nussbaum assigns to Practical Reason and 
Affiliation because of the role they play to “organize and suffuse all the others, making their 
pursuit truly human,” (2000, 82) the basic capabilities “should be made available in a form that 
involves the particular resources and environmental experiences that make a human life what it 
currently is” (Holland 2008, 324).9 As the potential damages associated with climate change 
and its effects become ever clearer to us, it is important to recognize that the natural 
environment’s supportive abilities are not maintained regardless of our impacts on its processes 
and systems. Accordingly, protection and mitigation measures will be needed to effectively 
ensure that the ecological conditions for capability enablement are met. When we consider the 
extent to which capability achievement is dependent on environmental functioning, 
considerations about damages which are being caused and will continue to be caused by climate 
change become urgent concerns from the standpoint of justice, if they were not already.  
 
3. Intergenerational Applications of a Modified Capabilities Approach 
 So, what can the capabilities approach, so modified, tell us about our obligations to 
future generations, considering the projected damages associated with anthropogenic climate 
change? First and perhaps foremost, the view provides us with a usable, intuitive, and multi-
dimensional notion of harms inflicted on both currently existing and future people. The 
capabilities approach identifies and gives substantive normative content to a threshold notion 
of harm.10 Taking as our starting point Nussbaum’s argument that core capabilities must be 
enabled to some degree in order for us to live lives that are worthy of human dignity, we may 
define the threshold by referencing them.11 Crucially, these are the things that make us human 
in many relevant ways, derived from asking ourselves what we are able to do and be. As our 
range of capabilities falls below the threshold identified by the list, we are harmed by any such 
restrictions, as in cases of a loss of political voice or freedom of conscience, of one’s capacity 
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for health, or of one’s capacity for a reasonably long and dignified life for reasons beyond one’s 
choice or control. In cases of such deprivation, life is perhaps less or unworthy of human 
dignity, as this requires, on Nussbaum's account, an ample threshold level of the central 
capabilities.12 If there are no strong and morally salient differences between us and future 
generations of people as John Nolt (2017a) and others have argued, then there does not seem to 
be any particular reason that capability deprivation may not constitute a considerable kind of 
harm for those future people as well, provided we agree that the capabilities Nussbaum 
identifies are of substantial moral relevance. 
 If we consider capability enablement as a relevant objective of our thinking about what 
justice requires, and view the core capabilities as central to the development and flourishing of 
present and future people, and if we recognize the extent to which those capabilities tend to 
depend on certain kinds of environmental functioning, the following considerations come into 
very clear focus. Because global climate change will undermine environmental functions in a 
multitude of ways, it also stands to drastically undermine the capability ranges of humans, thus 
harming them in the aforementioned way. While we are already beginning to see the adverse 
effects of climate change, these harms are of particular concern when thinking 
intergenerationally. As the results and effects of climate change will only further compound 
and worsen in the future (IPCC 2014), these harms will increasingly and disproportionately fall 
on future generations.13  
 The most materially basic capabilities—such as Life and Bodily Health—can and will 
be undermined by the increasing physical harms and casualties brought on by the effects of a 
still rising trend of greenhouse gas emissions. As global emissions rise, so too does air pollution, 
affecting the respiratory health and shortening the lives of many people. As more heat from 
those same emissions is trapped in the atmosphere, surface temperatures, too, will rise. This 
trend affects people’s health not only directly (e.g., via lack of shelter from the heat), but 
additionally in terms of threatening crops, water sources, and other sources of nourishment 
necessary for life, as above. One result of climate change predicted by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is gradually increasing desertification and a decreasing 
prevalence of water sources.14 Such changes in the climate will, given that substantial and 
consistent-over-time sources of water are necessary for crop growth, necessary food sources, 
too will enter a trend of decline. Via the loss of food and water sources alone, climate change 
will cause substantial damage in terms of the lives and bodily health of a large extent of the 
world’s population.15 These trends can pose various indirect dangers to others via expanding 
the geographical range of invasive species and disease carrying organisms, limiting 
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opportunities for local resource exchanges, etc. Recent efforts to quantify mortality rates due to 
climate change-related causes have produced varied results, but consistently yield casualties in 
the hundreds of thousands.16 Casualties of this magnitude are, of course, of significant moral 
concern today, but their numbers will only increase as damages compound in the future. By the 
year 2100, some project that climate change will cause tens of millions of deaths if not more 
(Broome 2012).17 Climate change, as Peter Singer (2002) colorfully and rightfully puts it, “has 
revealed bizarre new ways of killing people.” Our best projections indicate that it will continue 
to do so into the foreseeable future, and likely beyond. 
 Other core human capabilities will be undermined for millions by climate change 
prompted material displacement and migration. Drastic changes in climate will require 
multitudes to leave their homes and possessions based on temperature rise and its 
aforementioned effects, shifting weather patterns and anomalies, etc. With the loss of one’s 
home, one may be forced into a somewhat rootless or nomadic existence (as tales of the plight 
of displaced refugees remind us), thus losing the “sense of place” required by the Affiliation 
capability, as well as the relatively unrestrained freedom of movement the Bodily Integrity 
capability requires. Climate-induced migrations are already forcing (and will continue to force) 
many to leave not only their own properties and belongings, but their home countries as well. 
This is perhaps particularly harmful with respect to the requirements of Bodily Integrity, as no 
current framework exists in international law to handle climate refugees18 Moreover, many 
facing this sort of adversity will have their opportunities for any sort of educational or creative 
pursuits as required by the Senses, Imagination, and Thought capability drastically abridged. 
They will also lose opportunities that are integral to the Control over one’s Environment 
capability, insofar as a displaced refugee can—for substantial and often unknown extents of 
time—no longer meaningfully participate in any sort of political choices, hold property 
reasonably, or seek employment and advancement opportunities. 
 In addition to many straightforward cases in which climate change can affect the 
enablement of materially basic capabilities for future generations, the changes brought on by 
climate change will affect other capacities in less obvious (and perhaps more damaging) ways. 
Consider, for instance, the Practical Reason capability from Nussbaum's list, according to 
which we must be enabled to “form a conception of the good, and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of [our lives]”, or the Emotion capability, which requires “being able to have 
attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to 
grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and 
justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety” (2006, 
 373  
 
 
 
 
ethic@ - Florianópolis, Santa Catarina, Brasil, v. 17, n. 3, p. 363 – 388. Dez. 2018 
RICHARDSON, A. M. Toward a Capability-Based Account  
 
78). To understand the adverse effects victims of climate change could see with respect to this 
capability, we can follow Holland in looking to industrialized nations like the United States, 
which is expected to experience what we might regard as much less of the damaging effects of 
climate change than many places in the still-developing world. One consequence of climate 
change for even citizens of the affluent United States is a dramatic increase the frequency, 
severity, and range of storm events. Holland (2012) recalls Hurricane Katrina, which struck 
Louisiana’s Gulf Coast in the Fall of 2005, as exactly the sort of weather event that a shifting 
global climate will make more frequent. Many have attributed the strength and severity of that 
storm, as well as more recent weather events (e.g., Maria and Irma, which struck Puerto Rico, 
Dominica, and states along the U.S.’s southern seaboard in the Fall of 2017) to rising water 
surface temperatures, which is yet another projected consequence of climate change that will 
continue and worsen over time (IPCC 2014).  
 While the damages of Maria and Irma are still being assessed, Hurricane Katrina had a 
devastating impact on residents of the United States’ Gulf Coast region, particularly centralized 
in the densely populated city of New Orleans. In addition to destroying some victims' lives, 
health, and homes, the storm would have a much deeper and more prolonged effect on many 
over time. Those who fled their homes and who were affected in other ways experienced 
profound psychological trauma that long outlived the event itself. One representative study 
(Kessler et al. 2008) found that large percentages of those affected experienced (in addition to 
significant financial, income, or housing loss) extreme physical and psychological adversity, 
such as threats of physical violence, sleeping on floors with many other victims, lack of 
nourishment, etc.  
In addition to the very clear psychological and emotional damages inflicted by these 
sorts of climate change-induced adversity, Holland reminds us that events of this ilk pose a real 
threat to the way victims conceive of their own lives as a comprehensive whole, damaging 
(sometimes irreparably) their ability to make decisions and plans in the interests of their various 
conceptions of the good. When our lives are so affected by an externally cataclysmic force such 
as a natural disaster, we may experience a profound shift in our basic understanding of what to 
expect from the world around us, as well as our own personal frameworks of assumption about 
how we relate to the world: “For instance, the shift can involve moving from a baseline 
assumption that one has personal control over one's own actions and one's relation to the world 
one inhabits, to an assumption that one lacks personal control in both of these areas” (Holland 
2012, 154). With such results considered, we can see how climate change may dramatically 
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undermine one's sense of agency by eroding the self-regard and self-legislation necessary for 
planning one’s own life in accordance with the Practical Reason capability.  
 As the adverse effects of climate change increase in frequency and severity throughout 
the temporal purview of future generations, it is clear that victims’ core capabilities—indeed, 
some of the very things that make their lives “worthy of the dignity of a human being”—are in 
jeopardy.19 In these ways, employing the capabilities approach (with an environmental meta-
capability in tow) as a metric for the harms caused by climate change, not only now, but 
generations into the future, seems undeniably fruitful. Holland proposes that we set 
conservation and environmental protection benchmarks with reference to the environmental 
meta-capability so that the current generation’s range of capabilities are enabled. I propose that 
we generalize this sort of view in a forward-looking sense for future generations, provided, of 
course, that they are not morally different enough from us to warrant differential capability 
enablement and protection. I'll now discuss whether and how this seems to be the case. 
 
4. Some Strengths of a Capability-Based Account  
 So, ought we be concerned with the development of these capabilities in future 
generations? While I cannot here give a full defense of the capabilities approach simpliciter, I 
will offer some salient reasons to think it plausible and advantageous as a way of thinking about 
the structure of intergenerational justice. As Nussbaum articulates them, the core human 
capabilities are specified in a way that is suitably universal, meaning that they apply for a variety 
of people (in fact, she thinks all people) across a variety of cultures and societies at a variety of 
times. They are derived from asking questions about a person’s opportunities and options—
what they are actually able to do and be. These questions are, according to Nussbaum, 
“ubiquitous in human life; they are probably part not just of every culture but of every individual 
life” (2011, 123). In fact, she goes as far as to argue that the connection between those 
opportunities and matters of basic justice that her account traces is also ubiquitous in human 
life. She views her capability list as the most plausible result of asking these sorts of questions, 
but maintains its flexibility: “The list is a proposal: it may be contested by arguing that one or 
more of the items is not so central and thus should be left to the ordinary political process rather 
than being given special protection” as a matter of justice (Nussbaum 2011, 36).  
While some among Nussbaum’s list of core capabilities may be more questionable in 
this regard than others, I do believe that most of the list's constituents identify basic human 
capabilities that are centrally crucial to our existing and flourishing as the kind of things we are. 
That is, they do seem to be the sorts of things the value of which we can garner near universal 
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agreement on. Few would dispute this assertion with respect to the capabilities of Life, Health, 
Bodily Integrity, Affiliation, Practical Reason, etc. Even the more seemingly expendable among 
Nussbaum's core entitlements seem eminently valuable to humans. Play and Interaction with 
Other Species would likely be among these, but compelling arguments can be made for their 
inclusion (Nussbaum 2011, 37-39). If we take this line of thought seriously, and endorse the 
notion that Nussbaum's list can be gleaned with universal or near-universal unanimity from 
self-regarding questions about the opportunities and relevant capacities of dignified human 
beings, then it doesn't seem to be a far stretch to extend this notion intergenerationally. In so 
extending, we can recognize that future people, for all their potential differences from us 
(including their current nonexistence), will still be essentially the same sort of beings as us with 
respect to their morally relevant capacities.20 
 Other strengths of an intergenerational application of the capabilities approach become 
increasingly apparent when we consider alternative conceptions of justice and their potential 
for extension forward in time. A particular advantage comes when considering the context in 
which the approach arises in the first instance: as a well-motivated criticism of contractarian 
theories of justice (of which John Rawls is the most contemporary and stand-out representative). 
Most contractarian theories endorse a motivational assumption roughly corresponding to David 
Hume's "circumstances of justice," which assume the roughly equivalent rational and physical 
footing of respective parties to social contracts, as well as a notion of reciprocity that requires 
us to be able to enter into various relationships and agreements with parties to a contract.  
 This notion faces many problems in the intergenerational context, chiefly among which 
is the fact that we simply cannot stand in reciprocal relationships with prospective members of 
future generations. Stephen Gardiner (2009) has called this the “interaction problem.” Future 
people are radically different from us in terms of the constraining circumstances required (at 
least on a contractarian view) for us to enter into cooperation with them in that they do not yet 
even exist.21 If such conditions are the basis for reciprocity and contractual agreements between 
parties, and it is the case that this reciprocity relation is to serve as the grounding for our 
obligations of justice to such parties, one can easily see the issue. Contract theory doesn't seem 
to be able to fit the intergenerational bill—it cannot give an account of obligations to future 
generations or their particular members in a way that is natural and straightforward.22 The 
capabilities approach assumes no such restrictions on initial circumstances, and identifies 
fundamental shared capacities among similar kinds of beings as the morally and politically 
salient variable, rather than any particular relation between various parties. For the capability 
theorist, reciprocity and intergenerational cooperation are not necessary theoretical components 
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for recognizing the fact that future humans are likely—in terms of their capabilities to do and 
be—to be, well, human. 
 The intergenerational strengths of the capabilities approach seem somewhat obvious 
when it is compared with contract theory, but how should we view it in comparison with other 
competing accounts of intergenerational obligations? As a first point of comparison, the 
capabilities approach does not fall vulnerable to some of the deeply perplexing puzzles that 
plague some traditional moral theories which take up the status and well-being of future people.  
As perhaps the most oft cited example of such a puzzle, consider the Non-Identity 
Problem popularized by Derek Parfit (1984, ch. 16). The worry, in its most distilled form, is 
that in pursuing policies that we think will benefit future people in terms of welfare, we may 
actually cause them not to exist in the first place. Consider Parfit’s example of the policy 
decision between depleting natural resources at an enhanced rate and conserving those same 
resources. Suppose we, as a society in the middle of a long trend of resource depletion, choose 
to abruptly change direction, endorsing a policy of conservation instead. Parfit suggests that 
this shift in social priority will cause the current generation to behave differently in a multitude 
of ways, thus potentially altering the composition of the future generation we aim to benefit 
with our policy shift. The people we aim to benefit with the conservation choice, according to 
Parfit, might no longer exist as a causal result of that very choice. Moreover, for theorists 
committed to a traditional conception of harm involving a counterfactual comparison of a 
person in two alternative states (e.g., whereby harm is inflicted when an agent is made worse 
off than she otherwise would have been), the Non-Identity Problem seems to threaten the very 
idea that we can cause harm to future people. The capabilities approach does not fall vulnerable 
to this sort of worry in that it doesn't require the existence of a particular set of members of a 
future generation to account for our obligations to them. Rather, it only requires that they be 
sufficiently like us in terms of core capacities for various uniquely human functions. 
Furthermore, because the approach implies a threshold notion of harm (see above), rather than 
a more traditional counterfactual conception, it seems to largely circumvent non-identity 
worries in this regard as well, as the harms involved in occupying a sub-threshold state (as 
defined by the capabilities list) do not require comparison between states of existence and non-
existence. 
Another important challenge of Parfit’s is the so-called Repugnant Conclusion (1984, 
ch. 17). The general idea here, which especially affects some consequentialist views (i.e., those 
which hold that we ought to maximize total welfare), is that there are two ways to increase net 
utility across a population. The first and most traditionally obvious way is to increase the 
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relative welfare of the currently existing population—to make people happier. Another 
potential course of action, however, is to create more people among whom to distribute welfare. 
This strategy would increase net utility across the overall population, even if quality of life for 
existing people actually decreases, so long as the decrease is sufficiently less than the welfare 
of the additional people created. So, as Parfit’s continual search for “Theory X” (a moral theory 
which avoids this conclusion) attests, classical utilitarianism seems unacceptable as a basis for 
considering our intergenerational obligations.23 The capability theorist here remains undeterred, 
as, on such a view, capabilities are not the subject of a maximization strategy, and thus would 
not imply any similar mandate to increase population at the expense of individual well-being.24 
The approach, paired with a kind of intergenerational sufficientarianism based on Meyer’s 
(2003, 2015) conception of harm, requires a threshold level of the capabilities to make lives 
compatible, as Nussbaum suggests, with respect for human dignity. 
Given some of the problems which plague some attempts at determining the 
requirements of intergenerational justice, leading work in intergenerational justice has recently 
gravitated largely toward two influential classes of views: rights-based approaches like those 
of Henry Shue (2014) and Darrel Moellendorf (2014), and some forms of consequentialism that 
can remain invulnerable to the problems Parfit sets out in Reasons and Persons. The question 
remains how we might situate a capability-based approach with respect to these trends.  
To situate such an approach in this context, it is important to consider that rights-based 
approaches, which typically stress something like the inviolability of basic entitlements, are not 
without some problems of their own in the intergenerational situation. Both Shue (2014) and 
Moellendorf (2014) have suggested that it will be difficult to ensure anything approximating 
the inviolability of persons’ various rights and interests in a world affected by climate change, 
as massive violations would likely occur in any case. Relatedly, given the scale of the damages 
projected, it is likely the case that enabling some capabilities among some populations will 
directly affect capability enablement among others. Moellendorf illustrates the problem 
succinctly:  
 
Suppose that pessimistic predictions about climate change mitigation were 
correct; in that case, it would be unclear how a human rights approach gives a 
reason to prefer Mitigation over business as usual, given that massive human 
rights violations would occur either way (2014, 232).  
 
Shue makes a similar point, noting the same problem with a rights-based motivation to reduce 
fossil fuel consumption in order to reduce harm to future people:  
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If to prevent future harm we reduce fossil fuel consumption deeply and quickly, 
then (since we can’t build a renewable energy infrastructure overnight) we cause 
more harm now. But if we do not cut fossil fuel use deeply and quickly, then we 
are likely to harm even more people—once again, primarily the poor—over the 
coming centuries. Either way the transgression of human rights is monumental 
(2014, 316-317).  
 
In solution to this problem, Moellendorf gestures to what John Nolt (2017b) refers to as a 
consequentialism of rights—a sort of hybridized theoretical mechanism for determining how 
and why some harms to our interests are more or less egregious than others. The capabilities 
approach, on my view, offers an important contribution to this conversation. Thinking of 
intergenerational justice in terms of capabilities, I submit, offers some of the key virtues of both 
a rights-based approach and a sort of objective list consequentialism.  
The capabilities approach, like other theories, doesn’t directly endorse a particular 
solution to conflicts among interests like those mentioned above. Nussbaum’s version of 
approach, however, does enumerate capability values such that, at the very least, conflicts could 
be revealed in a clear and practical way, so as to prompt a well-informed public deliberation 
about which entitlements to sacrifice in favor of others, if (or perhaps when) this becomes 
necessary. David Schlosberg (2012a), Jonathan Wolff, and Avner De-Shalit (2007) have 
recommended using “clusters” of vulnerability or disadvantage (in terms of capability 
deprivation) to assess and prioritize various injustices for the purposes of policy intervention. 
Identifying such “cluster” cases where human dignity is particularly vulnerable (i.e., cases 
where multiple capabilities are not only threatened but substantively deprived) would allow us 
to prioritize some of the least advantaged (e.g., perhaps, citizens of the Small Island States who 
are likely to become homeless, stateless refugees) over the comparatively advantaged (e.g., the 
average citizen of an industrialized democracy like the U.S. whose capabilities are often 
threatened to a lesser extent by climate change) when conflicts do occur. 
When it comes to thinking in terms of capability conflicts over the long(er) term, it 
makes sense to go beyond the notion of “clustered” disadvantages and try to prioritize the 
entitlements Nussbaum insists are central. In general, proponents of the capabilities approach 
maintain the principle that the interests identified by the relevant range of capabilities ought be 
satisfied as a primary matter of justice (Nussbaum 2000, 2006, 2011, Sen 1999, 2009). If, 
however, as Shue and Moellendorf fear, the most pessimistic or tragic of climate outcomes 
comes to pass, and we are thus unable to protect or enable all of the constituents of a capabilities 
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list, we ought to maintain, insofar as possible, a way to adjudicate among these values in 
emergent or triage-like circumstances. While, as above, Nussbaum does not herself explicitly 
endorse priority relations among the capabilities, the unique challenges of long-term 
intergenerational justice likely demand some further development to the view. To fully resolve 
these sorts of conflicts would require a massive and comprehensive effort which is impossible 
here—but I will here attempt to sketch a provisional account of priority relations which are 
compatible with Nussbaum’s capabilities list as she advances it.  
It seems clear that the Life capability is a natural place to begin. Life itself is absolutely 
necessary as a physical prerequisite for anything else on Nussbaum’s list. To live a life worth 
living obviously requires living a life at all—more specifically, a life which is not brief and 
fleeting or threatened on a near-constant basis. Thus, in cases of conflict, Life ought be of central 
priority in terms of assessing or “ordering” the harms caused by climate change.25 Bodily Health 
and Bodily Integrity, though not necessarily coextensive with Life, are of a similar priority, as 
they put material constraints on a life that is, in some basic sense, worth living—namely, 
Nussbaum requires a life not unduly burdened by threats of major illness, physical or sexual 
assault, etc. To put my point in dividing these upper “tiers” succinctly, if one’s life or physical 
health/integrity are routinely under threat, other abilities and opportunities for self-
determination, choice, affiliation, etc. seem to be dramatically less attainable.  
Another resource built into the approach that might be of some use here is Nussbaum’s 
conception (following Aristotle and Marx) of a life worthy of a specifically human kind of 
dignity—a dignity that is perhaps not similarly conferred on non-human animal species.26 This 
commitment is expressed by Nussbaum in the Affiliation and Practical Reason capabilities, 
which play an “architectonic” role in her view, “[pervading and informing] all the others, 
making their pursuit fully human” (2006, 398). Thus, it seems, the capacities in these top “tiers” 
must be prioritized in a capabilities approach, at least in cases where morally tragic conflicts 
are present (Nussbaum 2011, 43-45). Thus, a long-term intergenerational capabilities approach 
might require a set of provisional but intuitive principles expressing a sense of the priority of 
each capability for human flourishing. It is my hope that it can begin to provide the resources 
necessary to adjudicate some of the conflicts between various interests (expressed in terms of 
Nussbaum’s central capabilities) that climate justice theorists like Moellendorf and Shue 
anticipate:  
(a) Life, because of its relation of physical necessity to the other capabilities, 
ought to receive first priority in decision-making; 
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(b) Bodily Health and Bodily Integrity, because of its specification of the 
material securities associated with a good life, ought to receive first priority 
in decision-making; 
(c) Affiliation and Practical Reason, because of their specification of the forms 
of engagement which set out some of the bounds of a fully dignified human 
life, ought to receive a second-tier priority; 
(d) Other capabilities (Senses, Imagination, and Thought, Emotions, Other 
Species, Play, and Control Over Environment), while not generally less 
valuable than those covered by (a)-(c), may have to be abridged, sacrificed, 
or otherwise adjusted in circumstances which are truly morally tragic (such 
as those raised by Moellendorf and Shue).27 
 
Such a capability-based account, so prioritized for a potentially tragic long-term, combines the 
methodological and normative urgency that might accompany a rights-based account with some 
consequentialist considerations about priority. Indeed, it can perhaps be viewed—at least in the 
far-term intergenerational context—as a species of a “consequentialism of rights.” As Nolt 
argues, “ultimately the presumption that human rights are, in every individual, morally 
inviolable must in the long term give way to an imperative to keep aggregate harm as low as 
we reasonably can, consistent with present responsibilities” (2017b).  The capabilities 
approach, I contend, contributes an interesting lens through which to view these harms, and the 
beginnings of a way to prioritize in cases of conflict.  
Given some of the above, a capability-based metric for assessing our obligations to 
future generations seems somewhat more straightforward and detailed as an account of well-
being than those accounts employed by some competing theories, and provides an interesting 
hybrid take on some of the considerations raised by others. Our consideration of future people, 
rather than being thwarted by the concerns above, is, from the perspective of the capabilities 
approach, based on core entitlements that we have no problem extending forward in time, 
provided that members of future generations are sufficiently like us in capacity.  
As a pragmatic addendum to these strengths, a capabilities approach could begin to 
address what is needed in terms of policy initiatives to protect our abilities to develop and 
flourish in a rapidly changing climate. The approach, coupled with an understanding of what 
environmental conditions enable the core capabilities, tells us much about how climate change 
can harm and deprive, and would aid in designing substantive political responses to various 
threats future people will face more and more. Climate change, from the perspective of the 
capabilities approach, can be seen as a cause of what Wolff and De-Shalit (2007) have dubbed 
corrosive “clusters” of disadvantages. This affirms, in real terms of human development, what 
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climate activists have long insisted—that climate change will make those who are already the 
least advantaged even worse off. Using this sort of approach as a guide, policy makers can begin 
to understand harm and vulnerability (for both this generation and future generations) at a 
deeper level, as well as motivating and implementing policies on the ground which seek to 
ameliorate these disadvantages. The restoration or protection of capabilities lost or threatened 
can also serve as an operational benchmark to measure such policies’ progress and 
effectiveness.28 
 While I do not claim to have provided a comprehensive argument in favor of the 
capabilities approach as a theory of justice full stop, I do hope to have provided some reasons 
to explore it further for its advantages as a framing device for thinking about the requirements 
of intergenerational justice, specifically. Nussbaum's list of core human capabilities, coupled 
with Holland's notion of sustainable ecological capacity, provides us with a plausibly articulated 
and multidimensional threshold notion of harm and a closely related conception of what justice 
might require for future people (i.e., at the very least, non-harm). If we have sufficient reason 
in the intragenerational case to consider capabilities relevant to justice and seek their 
enablement and protection to this end, I hope to have provided some reasons to think them 
additionally relevant in an intergenerational context as well.29 The application of this approach, 
as I have argued, fares rather well in this context, and can be adapted to answer some of the 
problems associated with long-term intergenerational justice. By seeking (insofar as possible) 
to enable core human capabilities as a matter of minimal social justice not only among our 
intragenerational contemporaries but our intergenerational successors as well, we can 
understand and begin to fulfill our obligations to them as such at a time where the well-being 
and dignity of future generations is perilously at stake. 
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1 Department of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (USA). E-mail: aricha28@vols.utk.edu 
 
2 Throughout this paper, I’ll make use of Nussbaum's iteration of the capabilities approach based on the central 
feature which distinguishes it from Sen's: an objective and purportedly universal list of those capabilities which 
are relevant to human development, arrived at by asking questions about what human beings are able to do and to 
be. I believe that Nussbaum’s explicit specification of these core entitlements aid its extension to an 
intergenerational context (specifically, as I argue below, via its contributions to our understanding of the harms 
caused by climate change)—particularly when compared to Sen’s insistence that capability ranges be defined by 
a process of ongoing public deliberation.  
3 Nussbaum purposefully does not restrict the relevance of the central capabilities to liberal democracies. In her 
view, they are generalizable from interrogating human experiences across societies and times, and are to this extent 
“universalizable.” Sen (1999, 2009) criticizes this reasoning, suggesting instead that relevant capabilities and 
ranges should be indexed to ongoing democratic deliberation by the society they are to characterize. For more on 
explicit differences between the two approaches, see Nussbaum (2000, 11-16).  
4 “Moral law requires us to act in such a way that we use humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of 
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 2011, 429). While Nussbaum’s 
conception of dignity (and the idea of a life worthy of it) does somewhat rely on a Kantian notion of the inviolable 
nature of human moral status, she does distance herself in important ways. Nussbaum’s conception, following 
Marx’s (and, she argues, Aristotle’s), departs from Kant’s understanding insofar as it maintains that the major 
powers and prerogatives of human beings need various kinds of material support, and cannot be fully expressed 
without such support. For Nussbaum, this idea provides the basis for arguing that there is some definable threshold 
level at which “a person’s capability becomes what Marx calls ‘truly human,’ that is, worthy of the human being.” 
See Nussbaum (2000, 72-74, 2006, 70-78). The Affiliation and Practical Reason capabilities play a central or 
“architectonic” role in Nussbaum’s notion of dignity, and she argues that lives without these capabilities do not 
meet her standard of human dignity. See Nussbaum (1995). 
5 The Other Species capability requires that humans be able “to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature” (2006, 76). This suggests an anthropocentric approach to environmental values, 
whereby other species are valuable merely instrumentally. For the purposes of this paper, and given my goal of 
generalizing the capabilities approach to determine the distinctive human costs of climate change as it may affect 
future generations, I default to anthropocentric considerations and remain somewhat agnostic on the further 
question as to whether the approach provides a suitable account of the non-instrumental value of other species. On 
this point, however, Nussbaum does briefly sketch the possibility of a capability-based approach affording some 
non-instrumental value to non-human animal species based on their own sets and ranges of capabilities, which 
may generate indirect moral duties governing their treatment. It is not clear, however, that this provisional 
extension is as compelling as Nussbaum’s central (human) case. For more on this strategy, see Nussbaum’s 
discussions of species membership and animal entitlements (2004, 2006). For another interesting attempt to extend 
the capabilities approach to animals, as well as ecosystems and the natural world more generally, see Keulartz and 
Swart (2012) and Schlosberg (2012b). 
6 See, for instance, WCED (1987). 
7 For a detailed account of the Affiliation capability as it relates to these kinds of cultural practices, see Heyward 
(2011).  
8 In view of the largely anthropocentric approach I take in this paper (and a relative agnosticism about whether the 
natural environment is valuable in and of itself), I am not in principle opposed to core capabilities being enabled 
to the prescribed extent against the backdrop of a synthetic environmental context—a sort of technological utopia 
in which the relevant relations can be preserved without the existence of a natural context. I am skeptical, however, 
that a true technological approximation of the relevant kinds of relations is possible on the scale and extent 
necessary to realize the kinds of human flourishing our current (natural) environmental context enables. The Inuit 
example I offer above (which I owe to Clare Heyward (2011)) concerns precisely the type of experience and 
capability enablement I fear would not be sufficiently compensated for by technologically-driven adaptation to 
climate change.  
9 Sen (2000, 2004) argues for a similar conclusion—that we have an obligation not to denigrate the choices or the 
environmental contexts of those choices for future generations, in order to preserve their capabilities. 
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10 For compelling developments on threshold conceptions of harm more generally, as well as some of their 
comparative benefits in the intergenerational case, see Meyer (2003, 2015).  
11 Sen, too, while maintaining some conceptual disagreements with Nussbaum, endorses the notion of a capability 
threshold for harm in his (1995) discussion of poverty and deprivation in the developing world.  
12 One might take issue here by pointing out that not all harms are necessarily wrongful harms. Such a distinction 
might reasonably maintain that a harm is constituted by any setback to one’s interests, while a wrong is constituted 
by some further injustice beyond the setback. The harms which are being caused and will continue to be caused 
by climate change, I submit, are indeed wrongful, as they consist in a minority (currently existing generations of 
people) causally inflicting harm on a much greater majority (some combination of future generations of people) 
which is causally inert with respect to the currently existent generation. Furthermore, the motivation for this harm 
lacks the mitigating excuse of necessity and is in fact often quite frivolous in nature (e.g., the US rate of carbon 
emissions being dramatically higher than other industrialized nations in the world based on practices of excess or 
entertainment). Cf., for instance, Nolt (2011).  
13 Some opponents of climate change mitigation argue that the income and wealth generated by fossil-fuel driven 
economies does sufficient work in terms of ameliorating poverty and promoting development across the world that 
such present goods may outweigh any future harms caused by climate change. In view of my focus on particularly 
egregious kinds of harms here (defined in terms of deprivation of core capabilities), I suspect that no amount of 
compensatory benefits (least of all economic benefits) can fully make up for harms caused to the agency of future 
people by climate change. Put more generally, even if certain kinds of compensation can begin to make up for 
harms, such compensation does not change the state of affairs such that the harm was never caused, nor does 
compensation make it the case that the preceding harm is no longer morally relevant. Moreover, to follow the line 
of reasoning in such an objection, I fear, is to enable current generations to stand in harmful, domineering, or 
exploitative relationships with our posterity under the justificatory guise that we are providing them with 
sufficiently compensatory benefits in terms of economic development. For compelling accounts of 
intergenerational domination and exploitation, respectively, see Nolt (2011) and Bertram (2009). To put the 
general response here quite succinctly, formal opportunity for economic development may be of little consolation 
if one loses one’s home and livelihood to extreme weather events, if one is displaced and thus loses one’s ability 
to control one’s life in various ways, or if one’s life or health is reduced drastically by risk factors connected to 
climate change. 
14 For a detailed (though not completely exhaustive) treatment of the current and projected damages caused by 
climate change, including the adverse effects of coastal flooding, reduced water supply, malnutrition and other 
health effects, etc., see the IPCC’s most recent synthesis report (2014).  
15 For more on the dangers of climate change in terms of food and water security see FAO et al. (2017) and 
Georgakakos et al. (2014) 
16 Development Research Associates (DARA) (2012) reports a current figure of 400,000 with an increase to 
700,000 by the year 2030. The World Health Organization’s (2015) report on a limited number of causes of death 
yields a figure of 250,000 casualties during the time period between 2030 and 2050.  
17 For a detailed treatment of assessing and measuring casualties caused by climate change, see Nolt (2011, 2014).  
18 Under the United Nations’ operational definition of a refugee (UNHCR 1967), people fleeing the effects of 
natural disasters or other environmental problems qualify for neither refugee status nor any of the protections that 
stem from such status. While some commentators on migration suggest that the logic, spirit, and protections of the 
UNHCR protocol can and ought to be extended to those fleeing climate change-induced disasters of various kinds, 
such a framework has not, as of yet, been the subject of any substantive international agreement or endorsement. 
See, for example, Risse (2009) and Lister (2013, 2014).  
19 According to the IPCC’s most recent (2014) synthesis report, continued emissions “will cause further warming 
and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system,” which are projected to accumulate and even 
worsen over the course of the 21st century and substantially beyond—by some estimates, over the course of 
millennia. 
20 It is, admittedly, a bit unclear how far into the succession of future generations the kind of approach I advocate 
can reach. It makes sense to think that there will not be any significant difference in capacities between humans 
born today and those born, say, 100 years from now. For instance, it is likely the case that human beings will 
always value materially basic capabilities like Life, Bodily Health, and Bodily Integrity. We will almost certainly 
continue to value our capacity for Practical Reason. I do, however, imagine there is a point at which this becomes 
a stretch, though it is certainly temporally distant. I’m thinking, for instance, of a bleak long-distant future where 
(based on environmental degradation, only extremely limited forms of Control Over One’s Environment are 
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possible, or where significantly changing economic realities make our current commitments and relationships to 
labor, and thus, to related capabilities like Play, unrecognizable. So, this theory is likely limited in its scope, though 
it is not clear that other normative theories of intergenerational justice fare much better in this regard over the long 
haul. 
21 Moreover, there is the issue of unidirectional causation to contend with: the notion that, while we can and 
frequently do causally affect future generations in a multitude of ways, the inverse is not the case—members of 
future generations cannot causally interact with us in any salient way. It certainly seems straightforward to suggest 
that this fact violates the conditions of reciprocity and rough equality assumed as the initial starting point for 
contractarian theories of justice.   
22 This is not to say that such extension attempts have not been made. Many plausible suggestions to this effect 
exist in the literature, though most require a substantial amount of modification to the core tenets and aims of 
contract theories. In fact, some attempts at explaining the bases of intergenerational contracts are perhaps scarcely 
recognizable as contractarian in this regard. For some such accounts, see Heyd (2009) and Attas (2009). For a 
more general account of the intergenerational difficulties faced by contract theorists, particularly in terms of the 
characteristic reciprocity constraint I have taken up here, see Gardiner (2009), and O’Neill (1993). 
23 There has, to date, been no wide convergence on a prime candidate for Parfit’s somewhat elusive “Theory X,” 
though some have questioned the extent of his conclusion’s “repugnance” for intergenerational forms of 
consequentialism. See Huemer (2008) and Nolt (2015) for some such discussion.   
24 In fact, a view like the capabilities approach would seem to preclude such reasoning, based on the fact that 
engaging in such a population increase would violate core capabilities among those who would engage in the 
reproductive labor to do so. For more discussion on this point, see Overall (2012, 73-75).  
25 The capabilities list presents us with several often competing and perhaps incommensurable values, making 
direct trade-offs quite difficult to assess. So, any ordering of the capabilities in terms of priorities will thus be 
partial. Here, rather than arguing for priority relations among individual capabilities, I sketch a “tiered” priority 
system which somewhat isolates classes of capabilities based on their relationship to Nussbaum’s conception of a 
life worthy of human dignity.  
26 See endnote 3, above.  
27 It is important to note that in cases of such sacrifice, a harm has obviously still occurred: “… any failure to 
secure a capability at a minimum level is a failure of justice, and we should work for a world in which those 
conflicts will not occur” (Nussbaum 2006, 381). But this is, of course, compatible with maintaining that some 
harms are worse than others. 
28 The World Bank and some private entities are beginning to follow a similar strategy in attempting to “map” 
climate vulnerability. See Heltberg and Bonch-Osmolovskiy (2011). For a bit more information on what 
capability-driven policy benchmarking may look like for initiatives like this, see Schlosberg (2012a).  
29 As remains a general problem with other approaches to intergenerational justice, this motivational assumption 
is something that will likely need further development specifically with respect to the intergenerational case. 
Nussbaum (2006) argues that we should be concerned with people’s capabilities insofar as we are concerned with 
respect for their dignity and status as persons, though her remarks are admittedly somewhat vague with respect to 
how far into the future this mandate extends. Sen (2009) draws upon our shared identity as members of the human 
race to argue that we are in a position to help future generations in terms of their capabilities, and thus, that we 
ought to do so. For an interesting account of motivational moral psychology for long term intergenerational justice, 
see Nolt’s (2017b) development of John Stuart Mill’s “sentiment of justice.” 
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